In recent weeks, INSCOP has released the findings of its first barometer for January 2026, shared through informat.ro. The political landscape following the extensive electoral period of 2024-2025 has been tumultuous, marked by numerous elections, unexpected surprises, signs of hybrid warfare, and even the rerun of elections. This lengthy period has shown a snapshot of public sentiment that serves as a diagnostic of societal discontent. Historically, Romanian society has experienced dissatisfaction under more severe socio-economic conditions than those we currently face.
Throughout this time, voter preferences highlighted an overwhelming inclination towards anti-system sentiments, sovereignty, and Euroscepticism. It is essential to note that this trend isn’t strictly about ideology; it is primarily about addressing public grievances. The initial supporters of these movements were not the typical electorate one might expect when considering their ideological background.
Post-November 2024, the radical voting behavior began to resonate widely across various social strata, although the intensity of this preference differed. In 2024, the electoral divide was largely defined by two factors: education and age. However, as we progressed into 2025, this preference for radical options spread significantly within the electorate of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The political landscape has thus become increasingly complex, encompassing more than just socio-demographic variables.
For years, political and sociological analyses in Romania rested comfortably on the dichotomy between left and right. However, recent developments compel us to reconsider the public’s perception of the political system through a different lens. The political compass appears to be systematically misaligned, as evidenced by the trust levels in President Nicușor Dan. By July 2025, his approval rating stood at 35%, but just six months later, it has dropped to 28%. This decline in trust is notable, especially considering that post-December 1989 presidents typically enjoyed higher confidence levels at the start of their terms.
This drop cannot solely be attributed to Nicușor Dan’s performance, which has been generally regarded as competent. He engages with the press and communicates effectively, trying not to provoke unnecessary dissent. Instead, this declining trust reflects a deeper antagonism within Romanian society, revealing a political expression of rising societal fractures. Discussions surrounding social divides have persisted, pointing to both internal and external factors fostering these divisions.
Currently, INSCOP and informat.ro have released additional statistics related to public perception of how EU membership affects Romania’s sovereignty. This topic is particularly significant as it influences voting preferences. Interestingly, many citizens desire the benefits of EU membership while simultaneously harboring misconceptions about the relationship between these benefits and European values. Notably, supporters of parties such as AUR and PSD are more likely to believe that the EU restricts national sovereignty. This sentiment further emphasizes the anti-European tendencies that have emerged.
Additionally, data reveals that men are more inclined than women to feel that EU membership undermines sovereignty. However, the gender demographics of those who do not share this concern are nearly equal, indicating higher rates of non-response among women. Among older individuals and private sector employees, there is a prevalent belief that the EU compromises Romania’s national sovereignty. Municipal rural populations also exhibit skepticism, albeit with a considerable number of non-responses.
Furthermore, 13% of AUR voters believe it would be better for Romania to exit the EU. This view is prevalent among various demographics, including men, youth, and those with lower educational attainment. Upon examining the socio-demographic profile of Eurosceptics, it is apparent that the distinctions between those who support a nationally-focused Europe and those who endorse the European project have become more fluid compared to 2024.